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One of the most important issues in contemporary environmental 
discourse concerns how to define humankind’s relation to the non-
human natural world. According to a number of environmental 
philosophers, modern Western humankind has often conceived of itself 
as dramatically other to, and far more valuable than, the non-human 
natural world. Modern humans define themselves as free subjects 
standing over against causally-determined objects, that is, the 
interlocking totality of phenomena in the non-human natural world. 
Sharply distinguishing between history (domain of freedom) and nature 
(domain of causal necessity), many moderns (capitalists and 
communists alike) have regarded non-human nature as nothing more 
than raw material for human purposes. According to John Locke and 
Karl Marx, value accrues to natural raw material only when humans 
mix with it their productive labour. Natural things, then, have no 
inherent or intrinsic value, but instead their value is determined 
primarily in terms of their use value, or of the price they fetch on the 
market. Viewing non-human nature in a wholly instrumental manner 
invites the kind of exploitation that has generated so many 
environmental problems, ranging from urban pollution to destruction of 
wildlife habitat.  
Modernity has also spawned anti-anthropocentric trends, however. For 
example, neo-Darwinism depicts humans as evolving by natural 
processes, and ecosystem theory interprets humans (and other 
organisms) primarily in terms of systemic and thermodynamic 
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processes. According to these perspectives, far from standing apart 
from the natural domain, humans are wholly contained within it. 
Environmentalists have often turned to such scientific developments as 
a way of countering the anthropocentric trends in modernity. Arne 
Naess has been a serious student of modernity, in both its 
anthropocentric and anti-anthropocentric guises. Concerned about 
anthropogenic environmental problems, he has urged people to begin 
asking deeper questions about the humankind-nature relationship. Do 
humans stand above and apart from nature, as its lord and master? Are 
people (and other species) parts of nature, strands in the web of life? Or 
are people members of the biospheric community? Those deep 
ecologists who conceive of humans as one strand among many in the 
biospheric web, seek to displace the hierarchical notion that humans 
stand atop a ladder of evolutionary development, because such a 
hierarchical scheme has been used to justify modernity’s exploitative 
treatment of non-human nature. Many deep ecologists propose a kind of 
naturalism, which denies any human exceptionalism and which asks 
that humans humbly recognize and appreciate their status as one 
interesting species among millions of others.  
Some deep ecologists go even further, suggesting that we regard 
humans as organs of the ecosystems that contain them as parts. 
Allegedly, such ecosystems are more real and more valuable than 
individual persons. I understand the attraction of regarding Gaia as a 
kind of superorganism, of which humans are ingredients, parts, or 
organs. I also am well aware of drawbacks to this view. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, I began to read Martin Heidegger’s philosophy 
as theoretical basis for deep ecology.1 In the late 1980s, however, new 
disclosures about the extent to which Heidegger’s thought was 
consistent with elements of National Socialism led me to reconsider not 
only the Heidegger-deep ecology link, but also efforts by some deep 
ecologists to regard humankind as merely organs of Gaia.2 National 
Socialism was in some respects a “green” movement, which 
promulgated far-reaching environmental protection laws. National 
Socialism, alas, also defined human beings in terms of racist biological 
categories, and emphasized that in its bitter struggle for survival, the 
German Volk would have to sacrifice individual persons for the good of 
the social whole, of which persons were merely parts. Calls for 
individual rights and freedoms were dismissed as instances of bourgeois 
subjectivity and selfishness. As an authoritarian social-biological 
holism, National Socialism was in some regards a kind of ecofascism.3 
Concern about ecofascism has subsequently led me to critically 
examine attempts by environmental theorists to depict humans as parts 
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of the biosphere, or strands in Gaia. The present essay concerns one 
such attempt. 
In this journal, the late Stan Rowe—a deep-ecologically oriented 
ecologist—published “Transcending this Poor Earth—á la Ken 
Wilber,”4 in which he criticized the developmental, hierarchical, and 
allegedly anthropocentric aspects of Ken Wilber’s book A Brief History 
of Everything.5 According to Rowe, we ought to conceive of Gaia as at 
least analogous to (if not literally as) a living cell, of which humans 
(and other organisms) are constituent parts or organs. Contesting this 
kind of approach, Wilber claims that it unwittingly helps to justify 
authoritarian socio-political regimes that would sacrifice individuals for 
the good of the eco-social whole. The issue of how to define humanity’s 
place in terrestrial nature leads me to raise the following questions: Can 
humankind be defined in a way that (a) adequately takes into account 
the remarkable differences between humans and other animals 
(differences that include the linguistic competence that makes science 
possible) and (b) avoids depicting everything other than humans as 
having value only as instruments to enhance human power and 
security? Can humankind be a member of the biosphere, even while 
also transcending it as a member of the noosphere? Is it possible to 
regard humans as standing high on the terrestrial holarchy, while also 
insisting that such standing, far from legitimating abusive and 
thoughtless treatment of non-human life, calls on humankind to respect 
the biosphere and its constituent members? Wilber’s work, in my view, 
allows us to give affirmative answers to all these questions. In the 
confines of an essay, I cannot elaborate Wilber’s complex position. 
Instead, I will focus on how he would evaluate critically Rowe’s 
proposal that humans be regarded as parts contained volumetrically in 
the terrestrial whole called Gaia. First, however, I need to discuss the 
complex part-whole relations involved in holons, a concept that both 
Rowe and Wilber find very useful. 
According to Arthur Koestler, who coined the term “holon,” reality is 
composed of hierarchical levels, each of which has its own structural 
uniformities that cannot be reduced to structures of lower-level 
phenomena. Holarchy is the term used to describe a hierarchy 
constituted by holons. Koestler argues that any holon has three different 
dimensions: first, it is a whole in its own right; second, it is composed 
of parts whose behaviour is significantly subordinated to those of the 
holon in question; third, the holon is a part of and is in important ways 
controlled by a more embracing or inclusive whole, that is, a holon at 
the next hierarchical level.6 Rowe notes that the holon  
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is a whole to its parts below, and it is a part to the whole above. Reality consists of 
relational holons, not separate “things.” The concept, a good one, dissolves the 
antagonism in science between reductionism and holism, for reduction is a way of 
understanding that moves downward in holarchies while holism is the upward 
view.7
Koestler developed a pyramidal model of cosmic hierarchy, with vast 
numbers of holons (sub-atomic particles) at the bottom level, while 
each succeeding higher level—atoms, molecules, organelles, cells, 
tissues, organs, organ system, and the organism—has fewer instances. 
Although affirming the usefulness of this nested hierarchy for 
describing the structure of organisms, Rowe contends that Koestler 
pushed the model beyond its proper limits, by accepting it “as the 
template for organic development and evolution, for animal locomotion 
and behaviour, for linguistics, and for human societies past and 
present.”8 Rowe contends, wrongly in my view, that Wilber accepted 
“Koestler’s grab-bag of holons and holarchies,” in a way that led him to 
“link non-homologous holarchies” and allow the rules that fit only one 
kind of holarchy to “uncritically be accepted as legitimate for all 
holarchies.”9  
In discussing James K. Feibleman’s “laws of the levels,” Rowe 
mentions other problems posed by generalizing organic (nested) 
hierarchy beyond their appropriate application.10 For instance, with 
regard to Feibleman’s first law, “Each level organizes the one below it 
plus one emergent quality,” Rowe maintains that it applies to the nested 
hierarchy constituting organisms, but writes that “The idea gets hazy 
when applied to sociological groupings such as family, tribe, ethnic 
group, societies with division of labour, and nation . . .”11 According to 
Rowe’s restatement of Feibleman’s fourth law, each organic level has 
some autonomy, but is also an integral part of and thus constrained by 
the higher level. “The integrative tendency of each holon must overrule 
its self-assertive tendency if the whole organism is to maintain its 
health.”12 In other words, the parts of an organism—for example, its 
cells or organs—must serve the interests of the whole organism. Rowe 
then goes on to acknowledge explicitly the dangers posed by 
authoritarian social systems, which treat individual persons as mere 
parts of organs. Overriding the self-assertive tendency, he writes, “is 
dangerous when applied to sociological systems [which Wilber will call 
social holons] for it can be used, as Medawar foresaw, to justify 
subjugation of the individual to the totalitarian state.”13 Later on, 
however, as we will see, Rowe invites such totalitarianism by defining 
human beings as subservient parts of the supra-organism, Earth, which 
is held to be more valuable than they are.  
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As Rowe notes, Wilber holds that “each emergent holon transcends but 
includes its predecessors, and evolution is a process of transcend and 
include.”14 For Wilber, planetary evolution moves from physiosphere 
(material-physical domain) to biosphere (ecosystems and member 
organisms) to noosphere (level at which interiority emerges for 
individuals and their corresponding cultures). Just as the biosphere 
transcends and includes the physiosphere, so too the noosphere 
transcends and includes the biosphere. At this point, in A Brief History 
of Everything, Wilber makes one his most provocative and 
misunderstood passages, which Rowe cites: “the biosphere is literally 
internal to us, is part of our being.”15 Such arguments,” writes Rowe, 
“assume the same kind of structural organization in physical, biological, 
and mental categories.”16 Although Wilber in fact emphasizes the 
differences among the “structural organization” of physiosphere, 
biosphere, and noosphere, Rowe insists this allegedly false structural 
homology, “when teamed up with [Wilber’s] Platonic philosophy, 
provide the bootstraps by which Wilber’s system lifts all reality into 
aspects of consciousness on their way to pure Spirit.” Rowe continues:  
. . . the conclusion that such common-sense phenomena as the physiosphere and 
biosphere—the Earth realities of air-water-landscapes in which humans live, 
move, and have their being—are interior, structural parts of the mind-noosphere 
can only ring true for dedicated idealists.”17  
Rowe’s criticism would have some validity, if by “transcend and 
include” Wilber means that higher levels are physically larger and 
contain prior levels volumetrically, as in the case of Chinese boxes. 
Fortunately, however, Wilber does not adhere to such a containment 
scheme. In his views, landscapes and biota are not interior to and/or 
reducible to states of human consciousness! The Mississippi River is 
not literally the “stream of thought,” nor is Mount Everest a figment of 
the collective (and delusional) human imagination.  
What stands in the way of understanding Wilber’s point is the complex 
logic pertaining to parts and wholes, a logic that must be understood in 
order to avoid the very kind of authoritarianism against which Rowe 
himself warns. What does Wilber mean by saying that the physiosphere 
is part of every member of the biosphere? Surely, a single mouse cannot 
volumetrically contain the Earth’s crust, oceans, and atmosphere! In 
Sex, Ecology, Spirituality,18 Wilber says that all physiosphere holons 
exist in intricate networks of relational exchange with all the other 
holons at the physiosphere level of structural organization. As a very 
simplified model for depicting the relation between physiosphere and 
biosphere holons, Wilber uses a checker analogy with physiosphere 
holons as black (level one) checkers and the biosphere holons as red 
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(level two) checkers. The red, second level biospheric checkers stand 
atop the black, first level physiosphere checkers, because the red 
checkers add a new dimension to a cosmos previously constituted solely 
by black, physiosphere checkers. Wilber states that the red holons 
embrace the black holons, but also go beyond them.  
Since the red-and-black checker depends for its existence on its own component 
black checkers, and since the black checkers themselves depend ultimately for 
their particular type of existence on all the other black checkers in their universe, 
then any level 2 holon in essence embraces all of its level 1 world by simple virtue 
of its own compound individuality.19   
It is precisely because physiosphere holons are wholly interrelated that 
Wilber can make the claim that the physiosphere is a part of any 
organism, even if the organism itself is composed of such an apparently 
tiny amount of the totality of physiosphere matter. Wilber’s point is that 
the physiosphere is a basic building block of the organism, but the 
organism is not a basic building block of the physiosphere. One could 
say that the physiological/material aspect of the organism is a part of 
the physiosphere, but in effect this is merely a tautological assertion. 
What is specifically new to the organism, namely, the fact that it is 
alive, cannot be part of the physiosphere, without the physiosphere 
taking on a dimension that does not belong to it. The physiosphere is 
more fundamental than and arose before the biosphere. Take away the 
physiosphere, and all organisms disappear, too. The organic or living 
dimension of the organism is not a part of the physiosphere, however, 
not only because the physiosphere lacks the phenomenon of life, but 
also because the biosphere is not foundational to the physiosphere. 
Hence, take away all organisms, and the physiosphere would remain, 
indeed, would retain its original matter/energy.  
The biosphere is a part of noospheric beings like ourselves in the sense 
that we are in one respect organic beings, constituted by living flesh and 
blood. Organic life is wholly interrelated, as evidenced by universally 
shared DNA and by hundreds of millions of years of intertwined 
evolutionary processes. Humans are not only organic beings, however. 
Humans are also noospheric beings. To represent this fact, another 
layer of checkers—green—must be added to the black and red ones. 
The noosphere transcends the biosphere, in the sense that consciousness 
(including animal consciousness) involves emergent properties that 
cannot be reduced to physiospheric or biospheric properties. Insofar as 
a human being is an organic being, it contains as a part of itself the 
whole of interrelated terrestrial life. Without the biosphere, the 
noosphere would not have emerged in the first place. Were the 
biosphere to vanish today, so would the noosphere, because biosphere 
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is the foundation for noosphere. If you destroy all organelles, you 
destroy everything above that level, including cells, organisms, biotic 
ecosystems, that is, the entire biosphere, but molecules and atoms, 
along with social holons such as stars and planets, remain unscathed. 
Far from being an “idealist” in Rowe’s derogatory sense, Wilber agrees 
with many other scientists that conscious experience (noosphere) 
depends on the physical and organic domains, even though noosphere 
cannot be wholly explained in terms of or reduced to those domains. 
There is no furtive “idealism” here, no attempt to reduce physical and 
organic phenomena to mental states.  
Noospheric-level beings, including all mammals, are characterized by 
greater interiority and thus have greater depth than biospheric-level 
beings. Because of its enormously complex brain, a kangaroo has a far 
more intensively developed interiority or “world space” than does a 
bush in the outback. By failing to take into account the depth dimension 
or interiority of phenomena under consideration, environmentalists and 
many scientists alike often propose holarchies based on size alone. 
Bigger, then, is somehow higher on the hierarchy. Neglecting to 
consider the interior aspect of phenomena leads to what Wilber calls a 
“flatland” ontology, which amounts to a reductionist materialism 
claiming that phenomena possess only exteriors. If Wilber is right, 
interior depth increases through evolutionary processes, with 
noospheric beings containing the greatest depth and, for that reason, the 
greatest concentration of value. Foundational for noospheric beings are 
the physiosphere and biosphere, which have greater span. There are far 
more atoms in the universe than molecules, many more molecules than 
cells, and many more cells than organisms. As depth increases, span 
decreases.  
Because the size of the biosphere is so much greater than the whole 
human species, much less a single human being, some readers may 
understandably resist the assertion that the biosphere is part of the 
noosphere. As physical beings, humans are mere “parts” of the 
biosphere, which is, after all, literally composed of atoms and 
molecules, including those found in human bodies. In Sex, Ecology, 
Spirituality, however, Wilber states:  
The human compound individual is not a part of the biosphere. Rather, a part of 
the human compound individual [that is, the non-living physical aspect] is a part 
of the biosphere, and the biosphere itself is a part of the noosphere.”20  
As organisms, humans are not parts of the biosphere, however, because 
individual holons (organisms) relate to same-level social holons (their 
biotic ecosystem or Umwelt) as members that are in constant 
interchange with the ecosystem and with the other organic beings that 
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help to constitute the ecosystem. Such exchange relations are absolutely 
crucial for survival and growth.  
Compound individual holons, which are most consistent with the laws 
proposed by Feibleman and Koestler, have a relatively centred agency 
and autonomy. By comparison, social holons have a distributed or 
nexus-agency, that is, they are not truly individual.21 A social holon 
lacks “a locus of self-prehension, a unity feeling as a oneness. In more 
general terms, it lacks a locus of individual self-being . . . the parts in 
this social system [the State] are conscious, but the ‘whole’ is not.”22 
An individual holon exists inseparably from its social environment, but 
“to the degree that we can reasonably recognize [its own particular form 
or pattern], we will refer to an individual holon.”23 For example, an 
ecosystem arises with and provides the evolutionary-developmental 
context for organisms that live in that ecosystem. Social holons display 
a whole/part pattern, are rule-bound, can be thought to develop (as in 
stellar or ecosystem evolution), and “can function with various degrees 
of upward and downward causation,” depending on their depth.24 
Wilber admits that some social holons, such as ant colonies, behave as 
if they were superorganisms, but he resists describing  
a social holon, such as the State, as being literally a superorganism, because all 
organisms have priority over their components, and yet with the rise of democratic 
structures, we like to think that the State is subservient to the people, and to the 
degree that [the latter] is true, then the social system is not a true organism (it is a 
social or environmental holon).25  
Holons always involve agency-in-communion. Macroscopic structures 
become environments for microscopic ones, and every system is linked 
with its environment by circular processes. The micro, for example, the 
organism, is always in relational exchange with the macro, for example, 
the biome composing the social holon of which the organism is a 
member. Whereas the organs of an organism (a compound individual 
holon) are parts of it and thus under its general control, the organisms 
in an ecosystem are members of it and not parts of it, because they are 
not under such strict control, because the complexity of organisms 
confers on them a relatively high degree of autonomy, and because 
ecosystem-organism are correlative aspects of the biosphere. The 
ecosystem is not more “fundamental” than the organisms within it, 
because organisms and ecosystem mutually influence and constitute 
one another. Humans achieve such a degree of relative autonomy that, 
as noospheric beings, they can try to dissociate themselves from the 
biosphere, as in otherworldly religiosity or mind-body dualism.26  
According to Wilber, greater interior depth is achieved in individual 
holons as they develop from atoms to organisms. Moreover, the size of 
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individual holons involved tends to grow larger (although there are 
some exceptions, e.g., some molecules are larger than some cells), but, 
in this process, span decreases. Hence, there are far fewer organisms 
than atoms, and organisms have much greater depth than atoms. As 
social holons, such as galactic clusters, galaxies, solar systems, and 
planets evolve ecosystems and biotic ecosystems, size tends to 
decrease, depth increases, and span tends to increase, but is variable. 
For instance, with regard to span we may postulate that Earth started 
out with one ecosystem, but gradually developed a certain number more 
over the eons. Here, ecosystem span would have increased, but there 
would remain only one planet Earth as the lower-level social holon in 
which a number of more developed social holons could evolve. Earth, 
prior to the emergence of life, had less depth and thus less significance 
than today’s Earth. A holarchy based on increasing size alone proves 
tenable only by (a) ignoring depth and thus significance, and (b) by 
ignoring the distinction between individual and social holons.  
Occasionally, Wilber seems to condition his view that individual 
holons, such as humans, cannot be considered “parts” of a more 
inclusive social whole. In fact, individual humans often behave as if 
they were little more than role-players in powerful social systemic 
processes. Without considering the first-person experience of such 
individuals, however, we cannot legitimately conclude that behavioural 
analysis provides an adequate characterization of what goes on in and 
for the lives of individual persons. Wilber’s legitimate concern is that 
very destructive consequences have ensued from polities (such as 
Stalinist Marxism or National Socialism) that depict individual humans 
as nothing more than organs of the state. Tomorrow’s eco-fascists (or 
eco-communists) would ignore the agency aspect of individual human 
holons, and would overemphasize instead the communal aspect. 
Survival of the social collective, so we would be told, requires that 
individuals sacrifice themselves and their personal interests to the good 
of the superorganism of which all life is merely an expression. If 
Wilber’s view is right, the fearless leader of an emergent eco-fascist 
state would be at best misguided in claiming that he is merely the 
mouthpiece, or the servant of the biological whole whose interests are 
threatened by selfish human behaviour. Arguably, both biotic 
ecosystems and the totality of such ecosystems lack the centred 
interiority or “consciousness” required to generate a perspective at all, 
much less one that the fearless leader would claim to be channelling. 
Critical analysis would be required to reveal what specific individuals 
and groups would be served by organizing society according to the 
dictates of an eco-fascist leader. 
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The difficulties involved in sorting out a cosmic holarchy are legion. 
Wilber indicates that many noted thinkers, including Karl Popper and 
Irvin Laszlo, subscribe to a version of the following hierarchy, which 
confuses individual and social holons.27 (Note: I have inserted 
“organisms” in the list for clarification.] 
Biosphere 
Society/Nation 
Culture/Subculture 
Community 
Family 
Personal Nervous System 
[Organisms] 
Organs/Organ Systems 
Tissues 
Cells 
Organelles 
Molecules 
Atoms 
Subatomic Particles 
Insofar as higher hierarchical levels depend on lower levels, which are 
their parts, this hierarchy is deeply problematic. For one thing, it mixes 
up individual and social holons, thereby raising some of concerns that 
Rowe voices. For another, if this holarchy describes (as it seems to do) 
the sequential stages in which its various levels formed, then biosphere 
should emerge more or less simultaneously with cells, not billions of 
years later, after the emergence of human nations! The biosphere does 
not depend on human societies and cultures for its existence; they are 
not foundational for it. One can imagine that the human species will 
become extinct, but this event would not destroy the biosphere. 
Destroying the biosphere, however, would surely annihilate humankind. 
As Wilber puts it, the biosphere is shallower (less complex than), but 
more fundamental than human societies. The distinction between 
individual (micro) and social (macro) holon should not lead one to 
conclude that the macro is on a higher level than the micro. Instead, 
individual and social “are two aspects of the same thing, not two 
fundamentally different things (or levels).”28 Hence, an ecosystem 
“isn’t a particular level among other levels of individual holarchy, but 
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the social environment of each and every level of individuality in the 
biosphere.”29 Corresponding to each individual organic holon, then, is 
an environmental or social holon in which the individual participates 
and on whose existence the individual holon depends.  
According to Erich Jantsch, the first biotic ecosystem was composed of 
the individual holons of prokaryotic cells. Hence, biosphere cannot be 
the final hierarchical level, because biosphere (that is, the biotic 
ecosphere) already emerged hundreds of millions of years ago along 
with prokaryotic cells. Ever since, the biosphere (social holon) has been 
co-evolving with life forms, including individual organisms/species.30 
Today’s biosphere has conditioned and has been conditioned by the 
totality of organisms that are members of it. The interior complexity of 
the noospheric human individual is founded on the biosphere, and the  
organic aspect of humans has constant interchanges with the biosphere, 
but neither the individual’s interiority, nor the culture of which the 
individual is a member, can rightly be regarded as part of the biosphere.  
Taking the foregoing into account, we conclude that value-
considerations help to answer the question, “Is the biosphere or the 
noosphere primary?” Wilber maintains that there are three value 
domains: ground, extrinsic, and intrinsic value. In terms of ground 
value, neither the biosphere nor the noosphere is primary. Instead, each 
is of equal value as a manifestation of Spirit. Spirit refers both to the 
ultimate source of all phenomena and to that which acts as the ultimate 
lure (attractor) to cosmic development, which seems to involve the 
emergence of ever more inclusive wholes. In terms of extrinsic value, 
however, the biosphere is primary because it is more fundamental: if 
one were to destroy the biosphere, one would also destroy the 
noosphere (conscious domain including at least mammals). On the 
other hand, all humans can be destroyed at no cost to the biosphere. 
Thus, the biosphere is primary, and this means that the biosphere is part 
of us. Remove it and we don’t exist. The noosphere is not internal to (a 
part of) the biosphere, however, because if it were, the biosphere 
wouldn’t work without us. But the opposite is true: Humans (and other 
mammals) don’t work without the biosphere. Hence, the biosphere is 
“part of” us. Many environmentalists intuit all this, but they often 
confuse what is most fundamental and thus has greater span 
(Gaia/biosphere) for what is most significant or has greater depth 
(noosphere), that is, what has the most intrinsic value. According to 
Wilber’s holarchy, because noospheric beings, including humans, have 
such enormous depth, they have greater intrinsic value than non-
noospheric life forms. Wilber’s views here largely overlap with those of 
Holmes Rolston III, one of the world’s leading environmental 
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philosophers. 31 Greater levels of interiority do not justify heedless 
exploitation of levels with less developed interiority.  
According to Rowe, Wilber “depreciates the physical and natural” and 
“cannot conceive any other source of values” apart from humankind.32 
In fact, as we saw earlier, Wilber asserts that everything has some basic 
ground value, quite apart from any interest humans may have in it. 
Moreover, Wilber affirms that all phenomena—living and non-living—
have a worldspace of their own, however constricted it may be. People 
should honour the perspectives afforded by such worldspaces. 
Ultimately this would require a measure of respect for all phenomena, 
from rocks to humans, from galactic clusters to ecosystems. Movement 
toward this dramatically non-anthropocentric view, however, first 
requires development of world-centrism, that is, mutual understanding 
among humans. A genuinely planet-centred perspective, which may 
emerge in the distant future, would eventually combine ecocentrism 
with world-centrism.  
Rowe affirms ecocentrism and at one point resists social 
authoritarianism, but his suspicion of anthropocentrism leads him to 
affirm a politically problematic (though common) logic of part-whole 
relations. Rowe states that a “logical ecological holarchy follows the 
simple principle of containment, viz., each level in the sequence is 
enveloped as a physical volumetric part by the next higher level.”33 As 
in nested Chinese boxes, Rowe states, “each higher level is the 
environment of those below.”34 After agreeing with Wilber’s nesting 
hierarchy for compound individual holons (molecules are parts of cells, 
cells are parts of organs, etc.), Rowe parts company with Wilber by 
stating that organisms: 
are parts of geographic ecosystems, which are parts of the ecosphere. Each higher 
level is the environment or “field” of the ones below, and each lower level is a 
functional part of the levels above. Note that in this sequence human organisms 
appear as one among many species-parts of the sectoral ecosystem that Earth 
comprises. Humans are made from and sustained by the living Planet. Physically 
and mentally they are Earthlings. Truly they are marvellous creatures, but not the 
be-all and end-all of creation.35
Wilber would certainly agree that humans, considered as organisms, are 
one species among many in the biosphere, are marvellous, and are not 
the be-all and end-all of creation. Wilber maintains, however, that 
humans are not only organisms, but are also noospheric or conscious 
beings. Such consciousness, however, whether human or animal, has no 
simple location in the sensory-motor world. Hence, neither 
consciousness nor culture can be “contained” within a three-
dimensional volumetric framework. True enough, the brain that 
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correlates with consciousness does have such a location, and in some 
respects the societies that correlate with cultures (norms, values, 
philosophies, and so on) do have locations. Because human interiors 
(both individual and cultural) are not spatially locatable, however, and 
because the noosphere (consciousness) both includes and transcends the 
biosphere, humans cannot be adequately described as “part of” the 
biosphere. Human (and other organic forms of) awareness is founded on 
the biosphere and physiosphere, but cannot be reduced to them.  
Rowe believes that greater external complexity combined with greater 
size and greater systemic inclusiveness justify the assertion that Earth, 
the ecosphere, includes humans as component parts. He calls on 
Feibleman’s fourth “law of the levels,” according to which the 
mechanism of any organization lies at the level below, and its purpose 
at the level above. Apparently, phenomena have no value in themselves, 
but only insofar as they serve the purpose of what is higher, that is, 
what “contains” them. Some elements of this claim hold with regard to 
the cells and organs of an organism, but Rowe and others go astray by 
maintaining that organisms are nothing but parts of ecosystems, rather 
than members thereof. If the purpose and value of individual humans 
are to serve the good of Earth’s all-containing ecosystems, humans—
like other organisms—are organs of Gaia. 
[T]he function of any given sectoral ecosystem of Earth can be learned by 
inspecting the interactions of its parts, which are organisms (including people), 
landforms, soil, air, water. Ascending the holarchy, the purpose of each holon is 
revealed in the context of that which encloses it. Thus the role of the heart is to 
maintain the animal organism in health. The niche of the animal is to play its part 
in maintaining the ecosystem’s integrity. Here is a clue to the role, niche, or 
purpose of the intelligent human animal in the context of Earth’s ecosystems and 
of Earth itself. Humans, like all holons, ought to act in ways that maintain the 
health and integrity of the higher-level holons—the regional geographic 
ecosystems and the ecosphere—in which they are encapsulated.36  
In another essay published in The Trumpeter, “From Shallow to Deep 
Ecological Philosophy,” Rowe reinforces his point: “Earth before 
organisms. Ecosystems before people.”37 Rowe acknowledges that 
some will ask whether the “the holarchy that places Earth above people 
[is] just another path to totalitarianism, to ecofascism?” Concern about 
ecofascism, we are told, arises from individualists and humanists who 
assume that “only people possess high intelligence, are important, and 
loved by God.” Fascism, Rowe correctly points out, is a human 
institution, not a natural one. Even though it is “ecological reality” that 
“Humans as Earthlings are subservient to the Earth,” “Earth’s 
ecosystems express no dictatorial decrees as to human behaviour.” 
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Humans are free to pursue whatever reckless and self-destructive paths 
they want.  
Earth generally shows humans the folly of their ways slowly, her responses 
presented as lessons to be learned. Whether Earth is recognized as humanity’s 
body/mind/spirit source and support, and whether or not people act responsibly on 
that knowledge is their choice.38  
By regarding humans as parts included within the ever-higher levels of 
bioregion and ecosphere, Rowe states that we “shift from navel-gazing 
homocentrism to Earth-venerating ecocentrism. Matched with Earth’s 
beauty, this [Earth’s creative capacity?] is a transcendence that Camus   
. . . would approve.”39 Unfortunately, a hierarchy based on volumetric 
containment could be made compatible with such a repressive social 
regime, leaders of which could readily couch in Earth-venerating terms 
the necessity that some humans sacrifice themselves (or be sacrificed, 
in case they are selfishly unwilling to do so on their own) for the 
“higher good.”  
Rowe’s provocative essay provides opportunities for environmentalists 
to rethink their views about part/whole relations among individuals and 
systems. Although I have criticized Rowe’s position, I want to 
acknowledge his attempt to make sense of humanity’s relation to the 
wider world, with the aim of encouraging humankind to treat 
physiosphere and biosphere/organisms with respect, not only because 
they have moral status but also because humankind depends on them 
for its very survival. Wilber, too, sympathizes with those like Rowe 
who are trying to construct wider and wider wholes, more integrative 
contexts to help people orient themselves—morally, emotionally, 
cognitively, spiritually—in the larger scheme of things. By thinking that 
what has more span is not only more fundamental than, but also has 
more significance than what has greater depth, however, and by 
conceiving of humans as parts of (and as less significant than) the 
ecosphere, Rowe tends to align himself with the regressive tendency of 
some deep ecologists. As I have argued elsewhere, deep ecology can be 
interpreted in a progressive way, one that is generally consistent with 
Wilber’s point of view.40 I encourage deep ecologists to regard Wilber 
as an ally in their attempt to characterize the humanity-nature 
relationship in a comprehensive manner.41 Alas, because of Stan 
Rowe’s untimely death, I will not be able to engage him in a dialogue 
about this possibility. 
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